What Europe Isn’t Doing to Stop Syria and Iran

As it turns out, however, that’s far from the truth—but the majority of the initiative must come from Europe. The European Union has thus far failed to confront the Iranian and Syrian regimes to the full extent of its ability. Though they are loath to admit it, European countries are Iran’s and Syria’s best customers, providing the EU with significant leverage. Meaningful energy sanctions could deliver a one-two punch to Iran’s nuclear weapons program and Syrian president Bashar Al Assad’s ongoing campaign to snuff out his country’s democratic reformers.

To its credit, the EU imposed oil sanctions on the Syrian regime in September, barring its 27 members from purchasing Syrian oil. Given that the EU consumes 95 percent of Syria’s oil exports, the embargo could potentially cripple the country’s economy. But there are loopholes in the EU sanctions that allow European energy firms to maintain their investments in Syrian oil fields, continue producing oil from them, and continue delivering it to their EU customers until mid-November. As a result, major European energy companies continue to operate there, including the United Kingdom’s Gulfsands Petreoleum and Petrofac, Hungary’s MOL, France’s Total, Croatia’s INA Industrija Nafte d.d, and the joint Dutch-British enterprise Royal Dutch Shell.

And when it comes to Iran, the EU remains the country’s most important global trade partner. Just last year, the total trade volume between the EU and Iran exceeded €25 billion. Almost 90 percent of Europe’s imports from Iran are energy, making the Islamic Republic the sixth-largest energy provider to the EU. While U.S. companies are prohibited from purchasing Iranian gas, and the Obama administration pushed the EU to ban the export of energy technology to Iran, Europe continues to buy Iranian gas. In addition, Iran joined Syria and Iraq in July as a signatory to a $10 billion natural gas pipeline agreement, under which Syria would eventually buy between 20 and 25 million cubic meters of Iranian gas per day, and run an extended transportation operation—the so-called “Islamic Gas Pipeline”—to Lebanon and the Mediterranean Sea, through which it would pipe gas into Europe.

If the EU decided to reduce its Iranian gas imports, the measures could jolt Iran’s fragile energy market, prompting secondary pain to the cash-strapped Syrian regime that Iran is aiding. Iran’s highly vulnerable energy sector has long been considered its Achilles’ heel. The country finances its nuclear program with invaluable revenue from its energy sector. A staggering 70 percent of Iran’s governmental revenues derive from its petroleum business, which makes up 80 percent of the country’s export activities.

Instead, however, the EU—and especially Germany, which is Iran’s number one EU trading partner—continues to have a soft spot for the Iranian regime when it comes to trade. Despite the new EU sanctions, German exports to the Islamic Republic increased by 2.6 percent between 2009 and 2010, reaching a total of €3.8 billion. German exports then dropped from approximately €2.22 billion for the first half of 2010 to roughly €1.76 billion for the first half of 2011, but German imports of Iranian goods increased from to €382 million to €453 million during the same time period. The Federal Republic’s consumption of Iranian gas and oil rose during the first six months of 2011 to €280 million, up from €197 million in the first half of 2010.

Benjamin Weinthal is a Berlin-based investigative journalist and fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
The above article was published in tnr.com on October 12th, 2011.

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